A theological and epistemological discourse: “sola Scriptura” and circularity

A theological and epistemological discourse: “sola Scriptura” and circularity

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A theological and epistemological discourse: “sola Scriptura” and circularity

Joshua Schooping’s chapter 9 of “Disillusioned: Why I Left the Eastern Orthodox Priesthood and Church” (titled “Thus Sayest the Church? Irenaeus and Presuppositionalism”) advances a clear contrast between what he terms “Eastern Orthodox presuppositionalism” (“Thus sayest the Church”) and Reformed presuppositionalism (“Thus saith the Lord” through Scripture). Central to this contrast is an illuminating juridical analogy involving a judge’s relationship to the law. This analogy merits further development and strengthening, as it exposes the structural incoherence of subordinating the epistemic authority of Scripture to ecclesial testimony while illuminating the proper hierarchical ordering within a consistent Christian worldview.

Schooping employs the analogy to show that the Church cannot serve as the prior or constitutive authority for Scripture’s canonical status and divine authority without inverting the divinely ordained order of revelation. Just as a judge in a well-ordered legal system does not create, validate, or authorize the law by which he adjudicates cases, lest the rule of law collapse into arbitrary judicial fiat, but rather interprets and applies a pre-existing, authoritative legal corpus to which he himself is subject, so the Church stands in a subordinate, interpretive relationship to Scripture. The law possesses intrinsic normative force independent of any particular judge’s recognition or application of it; the judge’s legitimacy derives precisely from fidelity to that prior standard. Reversing this relation, making the judge the source or guarantor of the law’s authority, would render judicial reasoning circular in a vicious sense and undermine the very possibility of objective adjudication.

Strengthened by Schooping’s broader argument, the analogy gains rigor when applied to the canon and epistemic certainty. If arguments for Scripture’s intrinsic authority (its self-attesting divine origin, coherence, and transformative power) exist and are rationally compelling, the Church’s formal testimony becomes superfluous for establishing that authority; anyone may, in principle, recognize it on the basis of those same arguments. Conversely, if the Church’s authority is logically prior and necessary to render Scripture authoritative, Scripture’s status becomes contingent upon ecclesial fiat. This inverts the proper order: the Church elevates itself above the Word of God, making divine authority derivative of creaturely testimony, an absurdity that blasphemously subordinates the Creator to the creature.

The analogy is further strengthened by noting that a judge who claimed authority to authenticate the law would thereby exempt himself from its constraints, opening the door to epistemological and moral relativism within the system. Similarly, an ecclesiology that treats the Church as the transcendental condition for knowing Scripture’s authority effectively places the Church beyond Scripture’s critique and norming function (“norma normans non normata”). Schooping draws on Irenaeus to show that even in the patristic era, Scripture functioned as the self-attesting rule of faith against heretics, not as something requiring prior ecclesial authorization. The Reformed alternative preserves the integrity of the analogy: Scripture is the ultimate law, self-attesting and axiomatic; the Church is the judge, fallible, subordinate, and always accountable to that law.

This framework dovetails seamlessly with, and is strengthened by, Gordon H. Clark’s classic defense of “sola Scriptura” against charges of vicious circularity. Clark, in works such as “An Introduction to Christian Philosophy” and his broader epistemological writings, maintained that every coherent worldview or philosophical system necessarily begins with an unproven axiom or first principle. No system can demonstrate its ultimate presupposition from premises external to itself without either begging the question or tacitly adopting a rival axiom. Alleging circularity against “sola Scriptura” therefore misunderstands the nature of foundational axioms: it confuses the transcendental starting point of a system with a deductive proof internal to that system.

For Clark, the axiom of the Christian worldview is that “the Bible alone is the Word of God,” from whose propositional content all other knowledge is logically deduced by the laws of logic (themselves grounded in the biblical doctrine of the Logos). Within this system, reasoning proceeds deductively and coherently; one does not “prove” the axiom from neutral ground but rather shows that alternative axioms (e.g., autonomous reason, empiricism, or ecclesial tradition as ultimate) lead to skepticism, contradiction, or incoherence. The charge of circularity is thus defused: it is no more vicious than the circularity inherent in any first principle (e.g., the empiricist’s reliance on sense experience to validate sense experience, or the rationalist’s use of reason to validate reason). Clark’s position reinforces Schooping’s juridical analogy: just as the law is the axiomatic standard to which the judge must submit, Scripture is the axiomatic revelation to which the Church and all human reasoning must submit. To demand an external validation of the axiom is to reject the very possibility of systematic knowledge.

Finally, Scripture itself provides the warrant for its self-attesting character and its independence from ecclesial conferral of authority. The locus classicus is 2 Timothy 3:16–17: “All Scripture is breathed out by God [“theopneustos”] and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work.” This declaration grounds Scripture’s authority in its divine origin (“theopneustos”), not in subsequent ecclesiastical recognition; it asserts sufficiency for the entirety of Christian life and doctrine without reference to any mediating human institution. Jesus Himself treats Scripture as an unbreakable, self-authenticating norm: “Scripture cannot be broken” (John 10:35), and His repeated appeals to “it is written” (e.g., Matthew 4:4, 7, 10; 22:31–32) function as decisive, non-negotiable authority in debates with religious leaders, without awaiting conciliar or hierarchical ratification.

The Berean example in Acts 17:11 further illustrates this independence: the Bereans “received the word with all eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see if these things were so.” Here, apostolic proclamation (even from Paul) is tested against Scripture as the objective, prior standard, not the other way around. Scripture judges the message; the community does not first authorize Scripture. Similarly, 2 Peter 1:19–21 affirms the prophetic word (encompassing Scripture) as “more fully confirmed,” originating not from human will or private interpretation but from men “carried along by the Holy Spirit,” thereby grounding its reliability in divine agency rather than ecclesial testimony. The early Church’s practice, as reflected in Irenaeus and others, consistently appealed to Scripture as the rule of faith against Gnostic and other heresies, presupposing its self-evident authority rather than deriving it from conciliar or episcopal decree.

In sum, “sola Scriptura” is self-attesting because Scripture claims divine origin and normative sufficiency on its own terms, and the Church’s proper role is to recognize, preserve, and proclaim what already possesses inherent authority—not to confer that authority. Making Scripture dependent on the Church would repeat the inversion critiqued by both Schooping’s strengthened juridical analogy and Clark’s axiomatic defense: it would place the creature above the Creator’s Word, thereby undermining the very epistemic foundation it purports to secure. This Reformed position preserves internal coherence, biblical fidelity, and epistemic integrity against alternatives that subordinate revelation to tradition or institution.

Eastern Orthodox Argument Against the Reformed Position

The strongest Eastern Orthodox counterargument, drawing on patristic sources such as Irenaeus and the Church’s broader tradition as the living embodiment of apostolic faith, proceeds as follows. The Reformed claim that Scripture is a self-attesting axiom independent of ecclesial authority inverts the proper order of revelation and leads to epistemological chaos. Scripture itself identifies the Church, not a collection of texts interpreted in isolation, as “the pillar and ground of the truth” (1 Tim 3:15). The canon of Scripture was not self-evidently recognized by autonomous readers but was discerned, received, and authoritatively confirmed through the consensus of the apostolic churches, the rule of faith preserved in the episcopate, and the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the conciliar life of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.

Without this living Tradition and ecclesial context, there is no objective criterion for determining which writings constitute inspired Scripture, how they are to be interpreted in harmony with the apostolic deposit, or how to adjudicate disputes. The principle “thus sayest the Church” is therefore the necessary transcendental presupposition: the Church, as the Body of Christ indwelt by the Spirit and preserving unbroken apostolic succession, is the divinely appointed guardian and interpreter of the faith. Appeals to Scripture alone (as in Schooping’s or Clark’s framework) reduce to private judgment, which 2 Peter 1:20 explicitly warns against (“no prophecy of Scripture is of any private interpretation”). Irenaeus, in “Against Heresies,” ties the truth not to texts in isolation but to the Catholic Church as the sole depository of apostolic doctrine, where the rule of faith is preserved in the succession of bishops. To treat Scripture as an independent axiom is to sever it from the very community that received, preserved, and canonized it, rendering the judge-law analogy incoherent: the Church is not a subordinate judge applying an external law but the Spirit-guided steward in whom the law lives and is rightly understood.

This position avoids vicious circularity because the Church’s authority derives from Christ’s promise to be with His apostles and their successors “always, even to the end of the age” (Matt 28:20) and from the Spirit’s guidance into all truth (John 16:13), rather than from a fallible human construction.

Refutation of the EO Argument

Biblically, the EO position overstates 1 Timothy 3:15 while understating Scripture’s own claims. The verse describes the Church as the “pillar and support” (Greek “stylos kai hedraiōma”) of the truth, i.e., the upholder and proclaimer of truth already given, not its infallible source or definer. The truth in view is the “mystery of godliness” summarized in the immediately preceding Christological confession (1 Tim 3:16), which is grounded in Scripture. Paul elsewhere commands believers to test all things, including apostolic teaching, by the written Word (Acts 17:11; 1 Thess 5:21; Gal 1:8–9). Jesus repeatedly appeals to “it is written” as decisive authority against religious leaders and traditions (Matt 4:4–10; 15:3–9; 22:29–32), without requiring ecclesial mediation. Mark 7:8–13 and Matthew 15:3–9 explicitly subordinate human traditions to God’s written commandment, warning that traditions can nullify the Word.

The canon was not established by later conciliar decree but recognized on the basis of apostolic origin, consistent usage in the churches, doctrinal harmony with existing Scripture, and internal self-attestation. Many New Testament books were cited as Scripture by second-century fathers (including Irenaeus) well before formal lists; the process reflected the texts’ self-authenticating character rather than ecclesial invention. Irenaeus himself, while emphasizing apostolic succession and the rule of faith, repeatedly appeals to the written Gospels and apostolic writings as the ground and pillar of faith (“Against Heresies” 3.1.1: the Gospel handed down “in the Scriptures, to be the ground and pillar of our faith”). He refutes heretics primarily by exegeting Scripture, not by bare appeal to episcopal authority independent of it.

Logically, the EO argument is circular in a way the Reformed axiom is not. Identifying “the Church” as the infallible guardian requires criteria: which succession? Which councils? Which consensus? These criteria ultimately appeal to historical facts, patristic writings, or Scripture itself—reintroducing the very interpretive authority the position seeks to avoid. If the Church is prior and necessary, one must first locate the true Church without Scripture, which leads to fideism or an infinite regress. The judge-law analogy holds: even in EO ecclesiology, the Church claims to interpret faithfully only insofar as it remains subject to the apostolic deposit; elevating it to constitutive authority inverts the order and makes divine revelation contingent on creaturely preservation. Clark’s point stands: every system begins with an axiom. The Reformed axiom (“the Bible is the Word of God”) is tested by its internal coherence and explanatory power; the EO axiom (“the Church as we define it is the infallible interpreter”) requires independent justification that Scripture itself does not supply for an infallible magisterium.

Roman Catholic Argument Against the Reformed Position

The strongest Roman Catholic argument centers on the divinely instituted Magisterium as the living, infallible interpreter of the deposit of faith. Scripture alone cannot serve as a self-sufficient axiom because it requires authoritative interpretation to avoid the fragmentation evident in Protestantism. Christ established the Church on Peter as the rock, granting him and his successors the keys of the kingdom and the power to bind and to loose (Matt 16:18–19; cf. John 21:15–17). This Petrine office, continued in the papacy and the college of bishops in communion with him, constitutes the Magisterium, which, guided by the Holy Spirit, definitively interprets both Scripture and Sacred Tradition (the oral apostolic teaching preserved alongside the written Word).

The Council of Trent and subsequent teaching affirm that the Word of God is transmitted through Scripture and Tradition, with the Church as the authentic guardian and interpreter. Without this living authority, there is no final arbiter for doctrine, canon, or moral teaching, leading to doctrinal chaos and endless division among those claiming “sola Scriptura.” The judge-law analogy fails because the Church is not a mere subordinate judge but the divinely commissioned body with Christ’s own authority to teach, sanctify, and govern (Matt 28:18–20). The canon itself was defined by the Church under papal and conciliar authority; to claim that Scripture is self-attesting and independent is to make the effect greater than its cause and to ignore that the early Church operated with both written and oral Tradition before the New Testament was fully compiled.

Refutation of the Roman Catholic Argument

Biblically, the Roman position reads more into Matthew 16:18–19 than the text warrants. Peter’s confession is foundational, and he plays a leading role among the apostles, yet the same binding/loosing authority is given to all the apostles (Matt 18:18; John 20:23). Nowhere does Scripture grant any single successor or ongoing office infallible interpretive supremacy over the written Word. The promise of the Spirit’s guidance (John 16:13) is given to the apostles and, by extension, to all believers who abide in the Word (John 8:31–32; 1 John 2:20, 27). Paul warns against any gospel, even from an angel or apostle, that contradicts the received apostolic message, now preserved in Scripture (Gal 1:8–9). The Bereans examined Paul’s preaching against Scripture (Acts 17:11), and the early Church is repeatedly called to contend for the faith “once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 3), not an evolving deposit requiring later infallible definition.

Jesus’ critique of the Pharisees in Mark 7:8–13 directly parallels later claims that authoritative tradition supersedes or equals Scripture: human traditions can nullify the commandment of God. 2 Timothy 3:16–17 asserts that Scripture is “theopneustos” (“God-breathed”) and sufficient to equip the man of God completely, language incompatible with an equal or superior human magisterium. No New Testament text describes an ongoing infallible teaching office with authority to define doctrine beyond or alongside Scripture.

Logically, the Roman argument faces the same circularity problem as the EO position, only more sharply. To accept the Magisterium’s authority, one must first identify the true successor of Peter and the authentic line of bishops, an identification that, historically and theologically, relies on Scripture, early patristic testimony, and historical criteria that themselves require interpretation. The claim that the Church “wrote” or “canonized” the New Testament overstates the case: the books were written by apostles or their associates under inspiration and were recognized as authoritative by the churches on intrinsic grounds long before Trent or even earlier councils. Formal definitions ratified what was already widely received, rather than creating authority “ex nihilo.”

The fragmentation objection cuts both ways: the Great Schism of 1054 and subsequent divisions within Western Christianity (including the Reformation itself) show that even with a claimed infallible magisterium, unity is not guaranteed. Protestant diversity centers on secondary matters while maintaining substantial agreement on the core gospel drawn from Scripture. Clark’s axiomatic defense applies directly: the Roman axiom (“the Magisterium as defined by Rome is the infallible interpreter”) is no less presuppositional than the Reformed one and must be tested by its fidelity to the self-attesting Word of God rather than assumed. The judge-law analogy holds up under scrutiny: Scripture functions as the supreme, self-authenticating law; all ecclesial authorities, including any claimed magisterium, are accountable to it rather than constitutive of it. Elevating human interpretive authority to co-equal or superior status contradicts Scripture’s repeated assertion of its own sufficiency and divine origin.

In both cases, the Reformed position, grounded in Scripture’s self-attestation and its axiomatic priority, maintains logical coherence and biblical fidelity without requiring an external infallible guarantor.

“For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal but mighty in God for pulling down strongholds, casting down arguments and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ.” (2 Corinthians 10:4-5)